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Abstract 
 
This paper gives an outline of three explanatory approaches to policymaking processes 
that allow the development of a rich set of non-trivial, probable assumptions. These 
assumptions provide a foundation for understanding climate policymaking behavior. 
First, the Unitary Rational Actor model provides a set of assumptions about the state’s 
interest in calculating costs and benefits as a basis for decision-making. By avoiding the 
inclusion of sub-actors in the analysis, it is possible to analyze behavior while assuming 
that the actor is unitary and in full control of the situation. Second, the Domestic 
Politics model presents a set of assumptions where domestic actors have different sets of 
preferences, and where the internal distribution of costs and benefits between them is 
crucial for decisions on climate policy strategies. And third, by applying the Social 
Learning model, the assumption is that the learning processes climate policy actors are 
involved in are able to change their interests and preferences as the policy process 
unfolds. The concern is not only with analyzing policy formulation patterns as a 
material calculus to maximize self-interest, but also with taking into account action as a 
result of social norms and the social environment. The development of climate change 
policy in Germany is used as an illustrative example throughout the paper. 
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1 Analytical purpose 
 
How can we explain the choices and behavior of policy-makers engaged in forming 
climate policy? If we are to understand how and why politicians meet the challenges 
that climate change poses,1 it is important to understand the political mechanisms and 
societal processes that capture the incentives in the policymaking process.  
 
The main focus in this paper will be to study if and in what way three different 
explanatory models can account for climate policymaking. I assume that the structure 
of the issue area can best be illuminated with the help of conceptual models, or 
explanatory approaches, that guide the research towards certain key independent 
variables that have a causal effect on the policymaking choices of climate change 
decision-makers. As an illustration, I look into climate policymaking behavior in 
Germany since 1987. Germany is an interesting case because it holds a leading position 
in Europe, both economically and politically. Also, the country seems to struggle with a 
gap between an ambitious role in the international climate change negotiations and 
difficulties with performance, i.e. problems with implementing sufficient abatement 
measures to achieve the country’s CO2 reduction target.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on how 
and when climate change became a political issue in Germany. I also look into the 
development of greenhouse gas emissions in Germany, the energy supply-mix and 
balance, as well as how to picture the policy-formulation process. Section 3 presents 
each of the three explanatory models that comprise the main focus of study, and uses 
German climate policy to illustrate the main assumptions made by the models and the 
differences between them. Applying the three explanatory approaches to German 
climate policymaking behavior thus allows the explanation to proceed in three steps. 
Section 4 presents some conclusions. 
 
                                                 
1 The climate change issue is characterized by uncertainty as to the scope, time-range and effects of 
a higher surface temperature on earth. The climate change problem is special in that it incorporates 
this uncertainty. It is also special in that it ‘hits’ the very heart of the economy, making energy 
production and consumption problematic because they are both vital to economic growth and 
major contributors to environmentally damaging anthropogenic emissions. Abatement investments 
are often costly in the short-term, while economic benefits from these investments often are 
uncertain and may not be realized until the long-term. Thus, climate change poses a significant 
environmental and economic challenge as a global issue that politicians have to face. 
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2 Climate change on the political agenda in 
Germany 
 
2.1 Short historical account 
 
Germany has been a European leader in developing a comparatively strong climate 
policy since 1987. Climate change first entered the German political agenda in late 1986, 
much as a result of the public debate that followed a report from the German Physical 
Society and the German Meteorological Society warning about the threat of a climate 
change. Strong media attention to the issue was spurred, 2 and climate change as a 
political question became a part of the increasing concern over environmental issues in 
Germany towards the end of the 1980s. This trend began with the learning and public 
awareness in the early 1980s about the acidification of the German forests caused by 
SO2–rich precipitation, and the discovery of the ozone “hole” in 1985. Media attention 
and political debate coupled the ozone- and climate issues, and thus created a sense of 
urgency also about actions designed to avoid a climate change. A concerned public 
opinion and consequently pressure and concern within the political parties led to, as 
early as 1987, the establishment of a parliamentary commission3 with a mandate to the 
science of climate change. The Enquete Commission presented its report to the 
parliament in 1990 with the recommendation that Germany reduce its CO2 emissions by 
25-30% from 1987 level within 2005. This aim followed the recommendations made by 
international agreement at the Toronto Conference on the Atmosphere in 1988. The 
German parliament and cabinet endorsed the need to respond to the threat of climate 
change, and agreed on a national target of 25% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2005
4.  
 
The process of establishing an international cooperative effort to curb emissions of gases 
that could provoke an irreversible change in the earth’s climate has been led by the 
United Nations since 1989. During the Rio Conference in 1992, a total of 154 nations 
signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), Germany among them. 
In addition to establishing its own ambitious national CO2 reduction target, Germany 
took a leading role in these negotiations. It was an explicit aim for Germany in this 
period to take an international lead on environmental issues, and by doing so set an 
example for others to follow5. Therefore it only made sense that at the Rio Conference, 
the German chancellor requested to host the first Conference of the Parties (COP) 
under the FCCC. 
 
In 1995, during the COP 1 in Berlin, Chancellor Kohl declared that the German national 
target would be to reduce CO2 emissions by 25% from 1990 level by 2005. This meant an 
important sharpening of the target, and it may have been issued as a result of Germany’s 
role of host during this important first COP. The announcement of a very 
                                                 
2 Interview with a representative from the German ENGO Germanwatch, Bonn, June 3, 1999, and 
Bauermann, C. and J.Jäger, ( 1996): “Climate Change Politics in Germany” in Politics of climate 
change – a European perspective, Routledge, London. 
3 The full name of this parliamentary commission was Enquete-Kommission Vorsorge zum Schutz der 
Erdatmosphäre, and it was in operation during the period 1987-90.  
4 Interview with a Bundestag representative for SPD, Bonn, May 31, 1999. 
5 Interview with a civil servant at the chancellors office, Bonn, June 2, 1999.  
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comprehensive voluntary agreement with the emission-intensive industries in Germany 
was also a well-timed move, believed to be driven by the country’s sense of responsibility 
to make this first COP a success6. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, after several rounds of very hard and 
comprehensive negotiations in the two years after COP 1. The Protocol was a 
breakthrough for international cooperation, as it incorporates legally binding reduction 
commitments for the signatories. However, the ratification process of the protocol is 
proceeding very slowly, causing serious doubts about whether it will ever be ratified by 
some crucial countries such as the USA, the EU, Japan, and Russia.  
During the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, in the period 1995-1997, Germany’s 
national strategy shifted towards a greater focus on the cooperation between the EU 
countries as their common negotiating position became firmer and better coordinated. 
Germany used its leadership position in the EU to help formulate the common EU 
position in the negotiations: to reduce CO2 emissions by 15% by 2010, and to be able to 
distribute levels of reduction internally within the EU countries.7 This agreement, in 
turn, served to further strengthen Germany’s pivotal role in the development of EU 
climate policy. The EU was able to win through with its proposition to be perceived as a 
common unity under the Kyoto Protocol and was thus able to achieve a flexible and 
cost-effective way of reducing emissions. The greenhouse gas emission reduction target 
of the EU under the Protocol is to reduce the emissions of CO2 equivalents by 8% in the 
first budget period (2008–2012). Germany alone will be responsible for approximately 
80% of the total EU reductions, as decided by internal distributive negotiations within 
the EU. This underscores the German leadership in EU climate policy8. 
 
The development of a German climate policy has taken place during the reunification 
period of East and West Germany. Tension, prejudice and a need to adapt to each 
other have characterized the unification process. The Federal Republic of Germany 
comprises sixteen different federal states, or Länder. The political and administrative 
system of West Germany was applied to the Eastern Länder over-night. The system of a 
social-market economy that was developed in West Germany after the Second World 
War has been a careful blend of market capitalism, strong labor protection and a 
generous welfare state. The success of this system has characterized the country’s 
constant economic growth in the post-war period. Including the Eastern Länder into 
the system since October 1990 has implied a subsidy of approximately DEM 150 billion 
per year to reconstruct that part of the country.9 The economic burden of this subsidy 
has fallen on the old (Western) Länder. Coinciding with a general recession in Europe 
in the early 1990s, this caused Germany to go from being the locomotive of the 
European economy to entering a period of recession. A quick look at recent statistics 
shows that the growth in GDP has slowed down and in fact was negative in 1993. The 
growth was 2.3% from 1995 to 1996. The unemployment rate has increased steadily 
since 1991, and remains at the high level of 10.9% of the workforce in 1999.10  
                                                 
6 Interview with a representative from the Association of German Electricity Supply Companies  
 (VDEW), Bonn, June 1, 1999. 
7 Commonly referred to as the “EU-bubble”. 
8 Ringius,L (1999): The European Community and Climate Protection: What’s behind the ‘Empty 
Rhetoric’? CICERO Report 1999:8, p.22. 
9 Federal statistical office Germany: http://www.statistik-bund.de/, December 1999. 
10 Federal statistical office Germany: http://www.statistik-bund.de/, December 1999. 
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2.2 Emission-levels and the energy situation 
 
When we look at the statistics, we can see that in the first half of the 1990s the CO2-
emission level fell in Germany but has since started to rise again. Between 1990 and 
1996, energy-related CO2 emissions in Germany fell by 10.3%. In relation to the GDP, 
CO2 emissions fell by 19% during the same period. The fall between 1990 and 1996 was 
13.3% per capita.11 The reasons for these trends are varied. First, the economic 
reconstruction and reduced use of CO2-intensive lignite coal in the new Länder has 
played a significant role in the improvement in the whole of Germany’s emissions 
balance. Of the total of ca.13% reduction of CO2 emissions achieved by 1999, about 12% 
must be said to be a result of the restructuring of the former communist Länder. 
Second, the link between economic growth and CO2 emissions continued to be severed 
in the old Länder to a certain extent. However, population migratory movements within 
Germany counteracted the trend, through immigration and an increased utilization of 
the production capacity in the old Länder. On the whole, per capita emissions of CO2 in 
the old and the new Länder today are at the same level, i.e. at approximately 11 Mt per 
year.12  
 
According to the federal government Germany needs a balanced energy mix that 
includes hard coal and lignite, oil, natural gas, nuclear power and renewable energies in 
order to have a reliable energy supply. The energy-mix trend shows that the use of hard 
coal and lignite as energy sources has declined from 1990 to 1996, whereas the use of 
oil, gas and nuclear power has increased. But still, about 50% of electricity production is 
based on coal, and about 30% is based on nuclear power. 
  
 
2.3 Policy formulation pattern 
 
When trying to explain policymaking behavior, it is here assumed that the process of 
policy formulation follows a certain pattern. It is a process of domestic bargaining, 
where the stages of the policy process are ideally sequential, but expected reactions and 
action in the next stages almost invariably influence policy action in the first stage. It is 
assumed that the international agreement is accepted or ratified at some stage in this 
process. Ratification is a negotiated product, based on a national negotiating strategy 
incorporating the actual as well as the assumed reactions of participants in the national 
policymaking debate. After ratification or acceptance of an international commitment, 
the government develops a policy to implement the commitments through certain 
policy measures. Society then responds to the governmental policy decisions. I also 
assume that governmental policy measures have an impact on the environmental 
problem. Societal response and impact assessments evaluate the policies in terms of 
their effect, and the evaluation can lead to policy adjustments.13 
  
                                                 
11 BMU (1997a): Second National Communication to the UNFCCC by the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  
12 BMU, 1997a 
13 This picture of the policy formulation process is largely based on Hanf et al.,(1996): The Domestic 
Basis of International Environmental Agreements: Modeling National/International Linkages, p. 40 
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The formal decision-making system is rooted in the federal, parliamentary democratic 
state system that West Germany has had since World War 2. The political parties have 
had a strong role in this parliamentary system. The establishment of a stable democratic 
order based on the model of the “social market economy” underpinned by legal 
regulation, free collective bargaining and co-determination has been a success for 
Germany. The German industrial relations system has been an important element in a 
virtuous circle: The distinctive institutions and traditions in industrial relations limited 
industrial conflict and encouraged workplace co-operation in high-quality production, 
while the resulting economic prosperity in turn contributed to peaceful and 
collaborative industrial relations.14 Only during the last decade have Germans been 
forced to relate to changing industrial relations, where the service-sector of the 
economy is becoming increasingly more important while the trade unions lose both 
power and members.  
 
Although the sixteen Länder are generally relatively autonomous, in environmental 
policy there is a hierarchical relation between the individual Länder and the federal 
government. This division of jurisdiction makes the federal government largely 
responsible for designing the environmental policy. The federal Constitution, as well as 
the rule of “competing” legislation and the right to issue framework legislation, provides 
the federal level jurisdiction to rule over Länder jurisdiction in most parts of 
environmental policy. However, the implementation of both federal and Land (state) 
legislation is almost entirely a matter for the Länder with their two or three-tiered 
administrative structure.15  
 
                                                 
14 Jacobi, O. et al.(1998): “Germany: Facing New Challenges” in Ferner, A. and R. Hyman (1998): 
Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, Blackwell, Oxford. 
15 BMU (1997b): Environmental Policy - Decision of the federal government of 6 November 1997 on 
the Climate Protection Programme of the Federal republic of Germany, on the basis of the Fourth 
Report of the CO2 reduction Interministerial Working Group (CO2 Reduction IWG), p.13. 
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3 Three approaches to explaining German 
climate policymaking behavior 
 
Drawing on the background features of Germany vital to climate policymaking 
behavior described in the previous section, this section focuses on an outline of three 
explanatory models. The starting point of accounting for climate policymaking here is a 
perception of explanation as a function of understanding and describing the problem 
issue, the actors involved, and the situational logic of the actors. This paper thus 
attempts to provide an explanation by following three largely complementary paths of 
research used to describe and understand actors’ choices16. In addition to providing a 
richer form of explanation, the advantage of applying more than one explanatory 
approach to policymaking behavior is that I can investigate into how much of the actor 
behavior each of the approaches can account for, and which provides the most fruitful 
approach given my particular purpose of analysis.17 
 
The use of the three models can help focus the analysis of the complex set of variables 
that influence policy-makers in the closely related policy areas of energy production 
and consumption and the development of responses to the threat of climate change. 
More specifically, the three explanatory approaches, or models, function as sets of 
assumptions about decision-making behavior. They are to a large extent complementary 
and hypothesize different but simultaneous elements of policy conduct. The feedback 
processes that invariably exist between the phases of the policymaking process indicate 
a partial overlap of the three models as analytical tools. By applying the three models to 
a particular situational setting, it is possible to outline and identify some important 
political mechanisms at work, mechanisms that are decisive for climate policymaking 
conduct.  
 
A focus on hypothesized causal relationships, or mechanisms, captures a dynamic 
element in the explanation, and produces a more concise type of knowledge. This 
knowledge is not of a general kind but is rather situation dependent.18 Accordingly, an 
explicit description of the elements that define the actor’s basis for decision will be a 
very important part of gaining knowledge about the particular situation. Therefore, 
description of the natural environment of actors is considered important. Likewise, it is 
important to establish an account of other strategic actors as well as of the social 
relations between actors in order to have input to explain behavioral choices. This 
background helps clarify our understanding of the actor’s actions.19  
 
                                                 
16 I think of actor’s choices in terms of being based on mechanisms at work which are important to 
identify. In this section I identify mechanisms through applying the three explanatory approaches.  
17 My use of these three approaches is largely based on Underdal, A. (1998): “Explaining 
Compliance and Defection: Three Models” in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, 
No. 1. 
18 See Elster, J. (1989): Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge, p.22. 
19 Farr, J. (1985): “Situational Analysis: Explanation in Political Science” in Journal of Politics, Vol. 
47, p. 1088.  
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3.1 First cut: Calculating state behavior   
 
When trying to capture the incentives of decision-makers, it can be useful to apply the 
Unitary Rational Actor model. This model provides an interest-based explanation of 
behavior, and its advantages are, first, the parsimony and rigor afforded by the 
assumptions of unity and control by the rational actor. Second, it can easily be coupled 
to the actor’s situational logic, and be used to ascribe interests to the actor’s role in the 
situation.  
 
Underdal specifies three basic assumptions that the model builds upon20: 
· States are unitary, rational actors 
· Decision-makers evaluate options in terms of costs and benefits to their nation, and 
only in those terms, and choose whichever option (is believed to) maximize(s) net 
national gain. 
· States are in full control of “their” societies. 
 
The assumptions imply that actors (i.e. states) calculate their policy behavior according 
to welfare gains and costs. Rational choice means value maximizing. The actor selects 
the alternative that has the highest-ranking consequence in terms of his goals and 
objectives. It is also implied that explanation is sought in terms of the context in which 
actors operate, rather than in terms of internal policy processes or structures. 
International structures guide behavior in certain directions and pose limitations on the 
number of options for action. Furthermore, it is assumed that states have one set of 
specified goals, one set of perceived options, and a single estimate of the consequences 
that follow from each alternative. Action is chosen in response to the strategic problem 
the nation faces. The various courses of action relevant to a strategic problem provide 
the spectrum of options, and the enactment of each alternative course of action will 
produce a series of consequences. The relevant consequences constitute benefits and 
costs in terms of strategic goals and objectives.21  
 
Applying these assumptions when accounting for a country’s calculations in the climate 
change context, we must keep in mind that the initiative to proceed with any kind of 
national climate policy comes as a result of the international climate change 
negotiations. In an anarchical world, a rational actor will not take on commitments as a 
sole actor, commitments that could be disadvantageous to the actor himself. Therefore, 
assuming that all states embark on developing a climate policy, we can deduce an 
important proposition from the unitary rational actor model: 
· The main incentive for a state to adopt policy measures is that the international 
regulations or agreements they are based on must provide expectations to reap net 
benefit, or at least not lose. The state will therefore implement policy measures 
according to what it has promised to do internationally only as long as the costs do 
not exceed the costs it would incur by defecting.   
 
                                                 
20 Underdal (1998): p.7 
21 Allison, G. T. (1971): Essence of decision – explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Little Brown and 
Company, pp. 32-33 and Skjærseth, J. B. (1999): The making and implementation of North Sea 
pollution commitments: institutions, rationality and norms. University of Oslo, pp. 45-46. 
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Cost/benefit calculations 
The Unitary Rational Actor model implies that a state’s perceptions of abatement costs22 
and damage costs play a deciding role in the shaping of national negotiation positions 
and determine the domestic policy choices in the climate change area. More 
specifically, the state is assumed to consider the net costs of environmental action 
compared with the net costs of inaction and status quo in the policymaking phase. If we 
consider the national costs Germany would incur by implementing the Kyoto Protocol, 
calculations show that they will be relatively small -- about 0.07% of the GDP if free 
emissions trading are allowed, and only 0.02% of the GDP in the case of no emissions 
trading.23 Under the Protocol, Germany can use a comprehensive approach to reduce 
emissions, meaning that reduction can be achieved through policy that includes six 
major greenhouse gases. If reductions must be achieved through reduction of CO2 
alone, the costs would probably be higher.  
 
The interpretations of the above estimates must be based on the fact that Germany is a 
large importer of fossil fuels for primary energy use. The country is heavily dependent 
on fossil fuels, with 40% of the primary energy consumption met by oil, about 27% met 
by coal, and about 20% met by natural gas. Germany’s own reserves of fossil fuels are 
very small, however, with only 6% of the world’s coal reserves and considerably less 
than 1% of the world’s oil and gas reserves.24 This means that Germany would benefit 
from a lower price on oil and natural gas, and that the calculations of the benefits it 
would have from buying emissions quotas would depend upon the fossil fuel prices on 
the world market.25 But a climate policy that includes regulations that affect the energy-
market will probably mean that the market will be changed and that important interests 
will be affected. So even though the total national costs do not seem high, one must also 
expect the state to calculate the costs that changes in the energy market will incur on 
society. 
 
Also, a state will consider its emissions, vulnerability and costs as functions of how the 
economic impacts of emission restraints vary among countries. Economies react 
differently to targets related to the emissions of greenhouse gases and the introduction 
of general abatement measures because the equilibrium and thereby the output of the 
economy will be affected. In the case of Germany, the reunification between east and 
west led to a restructuring of the East-German economy, with a particular emphasis on 
closing down unprofitable industries in the eastern Länder as well as closing down or 
rebuilding lignite-based power plants to curb pollution. This led to an immediate 
reduction of CO2 emissions in Germany of approximately 12%, or approximately 170 
million Mts., between 1990 and 1993. The “wall-fall” effect of reunification has given 
Germany a head start in emission reductions compared to other countries.  26 
 
Important input into domestic policymaking comes from the country’s relationship to 
other countries and the world markets. Climate change is characterized by an 
                                                 
22 Abatement costs are complex, and include both direct and indirect costs (such as trade-balance 
effects). 
23 See Holtsmark, B.J and O.Mestad (Forthcoming) “An Analysis of Links between the Market for 
GHG Emissions Permits and the Fossil Fuel Markets”. 
24 BMU (1997a): pp. 40-41. 
25 I am grateful to Bjart Holtsmark for clarifying this point for me. 
26 There has of course been costs involved, more specifically a yearly subsidy of approx. DEM 150 
bill., mainly for heavy investments in the industry and energy-supply sectors.  
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asymmetrical distribution of abatement or control costs across countries. There are 
significant differences in national emission profiles and in amounts of emissions of 
harmful gases from different countries. There is also an asymmetrical distribution of 
climate damage costs, especially between industrialized and developing countries. 
Coupled together with uncertain cause-and-effect relations and potentially significant 
costs of climate policies affecting a range of key economic sectors, the result is the 
complex dynamics characterizing the case of climate change.27 
 
A quick glance at Germany’s ambitious national emissions reduction target initially 
would convince us that the country is willing to take on more costs (a stronger climate 
policy) than an immediate cost/benefit calculus would suggest. National plans and 
government representatives28 point out that Germany is very interested in pursuing 
long-term climate policy strategies. Even though Germany’s welfare might suffer in the 
short term by applying certain policy measures, it would reap benefits in the long term. 
This partially because it would gain a head start in new technology markets, and also 
because it would build confidence in potentially important markets in the developing 
world for the future. At COP5 in Bonn in November 1999, chancellor Schröder said in 
his opening speech to the conference “if we do not embark upon climate protection 
now, we will loose the markets of the next century”29. He also reaffirmed Germany’s 
CO2 reduction target, and his ambition to keep it. It has been a specific objective for 
Germany to be a leader in international climate affairs. Environmental minister Jürgen 
Trittin reaffirmed this in an interview a few weeks before COP5:  
Germany will maintain its role as a front-runner in international climate protection 
into the future. During the Ministerial Segment of this Conference I will firmly support 
the idea of other States adopting a similarly broad catalogue of measures for climate 
protection as us. Measures for energy conservation, ecological tax reform, promotion 
of renewable energies and many further measures do not only benefit our climate, but 
also offer opportunities to modernize the economy. The climate discussion is proving 
to be a driving force in analyzing sustainable ways of living in industrial society and in 
doing so makes an important contribution to the public’s awareness of global 
contexts.30  
 
These statements indicate that the possibility of gains in the future is important for the 
calculus of Germany’s climate policy, probably combined with the anticipation of 
modest costs of implementing abatement measures, as pointed out above. 
 
Sustainable development strategies, while meeting the challenge of globalization, 
incorporate the importance put on having a potent industrial sector in Germany. 
Weight is put on the government’s willingness to prepare conditions that will make a 
strong and vital industry sector possible today, combined with a strong climate policy.31 
There has been a strong focus on the role of industry in the German economy, and a 
debate about how to keep Germany an attractive site for large industrial companies and 
future investments has been important in the 1990s. Now Germany is on the verge of a 
new era, economically speaking, where globalization and changing industrial relations 
                                                 
27 Ringius, Lasse (1997): “Identifying and selecting significant, less significant and insignificant 
actors in global climate change negotiations”, CICERO Working Paper 1997:6. 
28 BMU (1997b) and Interviews with a civil servant at the Chancellors office, June 2, 1999, and a 
civil servant at the BMU, September 18, 1997. 
29 http://www.bundeskanzler.de/03/27/, December 1999. 
30 Interview with Federal Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin in Umwelt No. 10/99 
31 BMU (1997c): Towards Sustainable Development in Germany 
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are forcing the economic actors to think in new directions. Part of this change has been 
the increased environmental consciousness that has made policy-makers aware that 
investments in clean technology and energy efficiency can create new markets and new 
jobs.  
 
No-regrets policy and issue linkages 
Over the last few years, climate change has lost importance as an issue on the political 
agenda while the more urgent issues of unemployment and social welfare have gained 
importance. Combined with the fact that the climate change issue contains a high 
degree of scientific uncertainty about the consequences, time frame, and costs of 
climate change, policymaking has become increasingly difficult for the government. The 
Unitary Rational Actor model predicts that the policy alternatives chosen will be of a 
“no-regrets”-character. This means that proposed policy measures would be equally 
profitable also if negative climate change effects do not emerge. When the question of 
extra costs become relevant, i.e. doing more than “no-regret” measures, the policy-
maker will have to consider the elements of uncertainty involved when making his 
cost/benefit calculus. In doing these means-ends calculations, the state is operating 
according to a logic of consequences where social norms or structures like 
environmental sustainability or preservation of nature do not count as much as material 
goods. 
 
The German government has had as a clear goal that all policy measures taken at this 
point should be no-regrets measures. The ministry of economy (BMWi) will not 
recommend a policy measure that would lead to unemployment or negative economic 
effects.32 The strained economy in Europe and Germany in particular, and the extra 
burden from the reunification process, are mentioned as underlying factors here. 
Another no-regrets measure derives from the debate about a possible “double dividend” 
achieved by introducing the green taxes that have been on the German agenda for 
several years. The red/green coalition government introduced a green tax reform in 
April 1999, with the argumentation that a turn towards taxation of environmentally 
unsound activities combined with a relaxation of tax on work would be good for the 
economy and create new jobs. 
 
The logic of calculating policy choices would suggest that there is reason to expect 
political synergy effects in policymaking considerations. Implementing abatement 
measures that affect the energy sector will have economic impacts on both the industry 
and the general public. It is therefore not likely that abatement measures to reduce 
harmful emissions can be implemented and become successful unless they harmonize 
with other policy concerns in the countries' energy sector. A multiplicity of mutually 
reinforcing political considerations must, according to the Unitary Rational Actor 
model, be expected to influence the formation of national positions on climate change.  
Both the assumption of no-regret policy choices and the assumption of synergy effects 
seem to find support in empirical facts. The central points are the worsened state of the  
German economy during the 1990s and the growing concern about the unemployment 
issue. Industrial managers expect the government to take action adjusted to the difficult 
economic situation of Germany. At the same time managers call for a more 
comprehensive strategy in climate policy, where all affected policy areas must be kept 
                                                 
32 Interview with civil servant at the BMWi (Ministry of economics), Bonn, September 23, 1997. 
CICERO Working Paper 2000:6 
Climate change policymaking –  three explanatory models 
 
 
 15
in mind.33 For instance, the government introduced a complete liberalization of the 
electricity supply market in Germany in 1999 that will force electricity suppliers to be 
competitive on prices. At the same time the companies must be ready to face 
competition with foreign companies also. This development will probably be easier to 
adjust to for large energy-supply companies. In Germany this means for the most part 
energy from coal-fired plants or nuclear power plants supplied to the grid by energy 
giants like RWE.  
 
The Unitary Rational Actor model has as a central proposition that rational actors seek 
to have the best possible information available when making policy decisions, about the 
preferences of other actors, the issue area, as well as about the range of options 
available. Looking at the international negotiating process, we see that the inherent 
uncertainty that characterizes the climate change problem has lead to a search of 
knowledge among states. The model would propose that Germany’s position in the 
negotiation is a function of expected damage cost, abatement cost, and its GHG 
emission level. These considerations reflect the state of knowledge at the time decisions 
were made. In the period 1987-1992, a very important process of knowledge 
development took place in Germany. The Enquete Commission carried out six studies 
for the German parliament, assessing the science of climate change. The studies 
suggested that a reduction target of 25-30% of CO2 emissions was achievable. The broad 
participation and general agreement within the Commission seem to have been 
important for the development of Germany’s climate policy.  
 
The three basic assumptions of the Unitary Rational Actor model can give us a lot of 
information about the calculations a unitary rational actor makes to decide on climate 
policy measures. The state is in control of “its” society, but its structural context and 
situation restrict it. International structures guide behavior in certain directions and 
pose limits to the number of options for action. For Germany, the economic difficulties 
and increasing unemployment of the last few years have been structures that have been 
important and restrictive for climate policy choices, not least because of the chances for 
decreasing competitiveness compared to major trade-partners in the world markets. 
This can be one explanation of why there is a discrepancy between ambitions to be a 
leader and the lack of political will for domestic implementation of CO2 reductions. 
Another international structural constraint may be the stalemate the international 
climate change negotiations have faced after Kyoto. The ratification process of the 
Protocol seems to have become a game of wait-and-see, where no Annex B country 
wants to be first to make the legally binding commitments. For instance, the EU’s tactics 
after COP5 seem to be to ratify only if the USA does so first.34   
 
 
                                                 
33 Interviews with a director in the coal-mining company “Rheinbraun AG”, Cologne, November 3, 
1999 and a representative of BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), Cologne, September 
16, 1997. 
34 Interview with a representative from the ENGO “Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung”, Bonn, 
November 3, 1999. 
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3.2 Second cut: Calculating domestic actor behavior  
 
The second approach I use to explain climate policymaking is the “Domestic Politics” 
model, which is an interest-based explanation, like the Unitary Rational Actor model.  35 
In addition to actor interests, the elements of power and influence among domestic sub-
actors are important to consider here. The general assumption of this model is that 
climate policymaking behavior can be accounted for as a result of decisions by policy-
makers triggered by different actors and levels of the political system in a state. 
Domestic actors affected by climate policy measures may have interests that deviate 
from the national/state interest, and this may influence the implementation of a climate 
policy. The most important difference from the Unitary Rational Actor model is 
therefore that the calculus of behavior by domestic sub-actors can lead to a lack of 
ability by the government to implement a preferred climate policy.  
 
This means that all the three core assumptions of the Unitary Rational Actor model are 
relaxed.36 First, the model perceives the government not as one single decision-maker, 
but rather as a complex organization where sub-actors pursue multiple objectives that 
are sometimes in conflict with each other. Relaxation of the unity assumption thus 
implies that policy decisions are influenced and formed by the interests of sub-actors, in 
accordance with their different sets of preferences, values and attitudes. Second, the 
Domestic Politics model assumes that the domestic sub-actors are not primarily 
concerned with the national welfare or  “interests” as such, but rather evaluate options 
with the aim of fulfilling a more subjective set of goals. The actors’ perspectives and 
interests are to some extent shaped by role and position or as Allison pointed out: 
“where you stand depends on where you sit”.37 This may be amplified because political 
systems tend to distribute power and influence unequally, and therefore produce 
outputs that deviate systematically and predictably from those that would maximize 
national welfare as conceived of in the Unitary Rational Actor model38. Third, the model 
assumes that states are not in full control of “their” societies, but on the contrary that 
the state has only partial control and is influenced and constrained by society. So even if 
a government would want to implement for instance a comprehensive climate policy 
strategy, it may be unable to go through with its plans because of domestic political 
constraints.39 
 
Cost/benefit calculations 
The assumptions of the Domestic Politics model suggest that not only the aggregate 
national costs and benefits count when a policy direction is chosen, but that also the 
internal domestic distribution of costs and benefits is important. In environmental policy 
it is difficult to find good solutions with respect to a distribution that all parties find 
acceptable. Curbing climate change often means introducing regulatory policy to 
change vital parts of the economy like energy supply, transportation and industry. This 
imposes costs upon the actors that the policy measures aim to change behavior of, 
actors that are powerful and important for the state economy.  
 
                                                 
35 See Underdal, A. (1998): pp.12-20 for a well-structured presentation of this model.  
36 Underdal (1998): p. 12. 
37Allison (1971): p.176. 
38 Underdal (1998): p.13. 
39 Underdal (1998): p.13. 
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The industry sector has been very important for the German economy after the Second 
World War, and industrial organizations like BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie) and DIHT (Deutsche Industrie und Handelstag) have been active 
participants in the national debate about climate policy initiatives. Industry is the source 
of about 14% of CO2 emissions in Germany, and consumes about 17% of final energy.
40 
The Domestic Politics model would assume that the potential costs that a climate policy, 
such as a carbon tax, would inflict on the industry sector would induce them to be 
active in lobbying the government. The model also assumes that the government 
depends on their cooperation, either voluntary or coerced, to introduce and implement 
climate policy measures. The distribution of power and influence may also matter here, 
and the large companies in, for example, the automobile, chemical and coal industries 
are well connected to the two major political parties (SPD and CDU). Industrial 
managers admit that their influence on climate policy is substantial.41 A voluntary 
agreement was announced by the industry in 1995/96 where industrial associations 
representing 4/5 of final industrial energy consumption committed themselves to 
reducing CO2 emissions by 20% within 2005 from 1990 levels. The agreement came after 
intensified planning of a CO2 tax in the BMWi prior to 1995, and was hastened because 
of the upcoming COP1 hosted by Germany in Berlin.42 The voluntary agreement thus 
had the effect of reducing the potential conflict level between the government and the 
industry, as both parties needed a new policy solution that they could agree upon. In 
achieving this, the long-standing tradition of good industrial relations and policy 
consensus in Germany seems to have been important, together with the importance of 
the organizational corporate channel in German politics.  
 
However, curbing climate change can, instead of regulatory measures, mean a financial 
support-policy to encourage development of renewable energy or more energy-efficient 
technologies. The model would assume that the distribution of costs and benefits 
implied by such policy measures would be equally important for the calculations made 
by domestic actors on behavior. As in many other European countries, the German 
society and industry is facing new challenges with trends like globalization, liberalized 
markets and changing industrial relations. The power-supply market is being vigorously 
liberalized, with tumbling electricity prices and a series of mergers between companies. 
The competition is very hard at the moment. In this situation it is presumably more 
difficult for electricity based on renewable energy to make its way into the market, even 
though the government has introduced a range of policy measures to secure that such 
energy is being channeled into the energy supply system. For instance the Act on the 
Sale of Electricity to the Grid has established minimum compensation rates for 
electricity generated from renewable energies, along with an obligation to accept such 
electricity into the public network.43 In general, the model would predict that policy 
measures that induce costs upon specific sectors of the economy while benefits are 
widely distributed throughout society will be difficult to implement.  
 
                                                 
40 BMU (1997b) 
41 Interviews with a director in the coal-mining company “Rheinbraun AG”, Cologne, November 3, 
1999 and a representative from the Association of German Electricity Supply Companies  (VDEW), 
Bonn, June 1, 1999. 
42 Interview with representative from the Association of German Electricity Supply Companies  
 (VDEW), Bonn, June 1, 1999. 
43 BMU (1997a): p. 121. 
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The policy process as a series of games 
Several political scientists have suggested that by applying the Domestic Politics model 
we can picture the effect of cost-benefit calculations by sub-actors if we analyze the 
policy process as consisting of a series of (partly overlapping) games.44 The time-aspect 
implied by this kind of analysis tends to make us see these processes more clearly. It 
seems clear that German climate policy has gone through at least three stages (or 
phases) of development. When the climate policy issue was introduced on the agenda 
in Germany, the actors who were most dominant were scientists, environmental 
agencies, the Green Party and the media. The environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs) were not so active in this initial phase because they have 
traditionally been working primarily with local or national issues.45 The main issue at this 
point was to assess as much knowledge as possible about the climate change issue and 
develop an agreement about the range of the problem. The parliamentary Enquete 
Commission worked from 1987 to 1990 (see p. 3), and was a pivotal consensus-maker. It 
consisted of 26 members representing a broad range of societal interests. In this phase of 
the climate policymaking process, the presence and strength of intermediate agents 
were important in articulating and aggregating concerns over climate change issues. 
The Green Party had a strong position in the public debate, supported by an active press 
functioning as a transmitter for new knowledge to the public. Counter-forces have 
traditionally been pollution-intensive industries and the trade unions. The ambitious 
target that came out of the political process around the Enquete Commission tell us, 
according to the Domestic Politics model, who were the dominant actors in this process 
and in the national debate at the time.  
 
Another assumption of the model is that the kinds of social values affected by 
environmental degradation are important for the policy choices in the next stages.46 The 
environmental awareness in Germany was growing in the 1980s and early 1990s, much 
as a result of concern about dying forests (Waldsterben), growing air-pollution in the 
cities, and other urgent environmental issues. Environmental consciousness is deeply 
rooted in the minds of Germans, articulated even in the first half of the century, both by 
the Social Democrats and the Nazi movement. A revival of environmental issues came 
in the early 1970s by the SPD. The valuation of both environmental quality in general as 
well as the valuation of specific environmental resources in the populace is assumed by 
the Domestic Politics model to influence policy-makers. Such valuations can also affect 
the society’s comprehension of the environmental situation or context, for instance in 
the form of culturally embedded attitudes towards uncertainty and risk. The concerns of 
the German public about climate change after 1986 continued the trend of growing 
environmental awareness. At the time, the domestic distribution of costs and benefits 
were relatively rough estimates and hard to determine exactly. Coupled together, these 
two elements probably contribute to explain why there was such a broad consensus in 
Germany about taking on a very ambitious CO2 reduction target.  
                                                 
44 See Allison (1971), Hanf et al. (1996). 
45 Beuermann and Jäger (1995): 212. This has changed during the 1990s, as there has been a 
development towards more professionalization of the environmental movement in Germany, with 
increased use of scientific expertise in the organizations. This has lead to a turn away from 
confrontations and more effort towards cooperation strategies with the government (Brandt, K.W: 
(1999): “Dialectics of Institutionalization: The Transformation of the Environmental Movement in 
Germany”, in Environmental Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1. 
46 Hanf et al. (1996) 
CICERO Working Paper 2000:6 
Climate change policymaking –  three explanatory models 
 
 
 19
Over the last five or six years, as the economic growth has slowed down, the public 
seems less willing to accept regulation that affects their own behavior directly. For 
example, there has been massive opposition to the ecological tax reform introduced by 
the government in April 1999. These “green” taxes mean more expensive gasoline, 
electricity and gas, and have caused a significant loss of popularity for the red-green 
government. The coalition parties themselves expect this to be a difficult process, but 
see it as necessary to proceed with reforms and hope for positive economic effects and 
thus a chance of regaining voters in time for the next election.47 The current tax system 
was formed primarily during a time when environmental concerns were given less 
weight, at the same time as reorganization and structural problems in the job market 
were less serious than they are today. 
 
The Domestic Politics model suggests that a new phase, or game, of the policy process 
starts when a country gets involved in international negotiations and agrees to 
commitments. For Germany the situation changed after the UNCED conference in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992. The country took on a leading role in the negotiations, and more 
domestic governmental agencies became involved. An inter-ministerial group was given 
the responsibility of working together to develop a climate policy strategy, and to report 
to the government every second year on progress and suggestions for new policy 
measures. The model assumes that the involvement of several ministries affects the 
policy process in relation to the relative strength of the different branches of 
government.48 Elements like institutional capacity and degree of involvement are 
predicted to be important for the degree of influence over policy formulation and 
implementation. In Germany, the environmental ministry (BMU) has had a 
coordinating role in the development of both the country’s negotiation position and in 
the national implementation work. But the BMU has had a weak role in comparison to 
the ministries of economy (BMWi), transport (BMVBW), and building (BMBF). The 
BMU has a small budget, only 0.7% of the total, and a small staff. More people work on 
climate-related issues in the BMWi than in the BMU. In addition, there has been a 
conflict of sector interests within the inter-ministerial group. Particularly the first two 
reports to the government were difficult to reach an agreement on, as they introduced 
many new measures and proposals affecting sector interests within the ministries.49   
 
As the attention shifted towards more specific policy measures, more sub-actors 
understood that their interests were at stake and that policy measures could be 
potentially costly. This triggered a third phase, or game, of the policy process where we 
have seen a greater involvement and opposition to demanding climate policy measures 
from a varied range of interests like industry groups, trade unions and the automobile 
organizations that had earlier been surprisingly in agreement with the government. It 
was in this period that the voluntary agreement between industry interests and the 
government was made, and also in this period that economic strain and increasing 
unemployment became more and more important issues on the political agenda.  
 
The ENGOs became more involved in the debate, as they became aware that climate 
change is one of the most serious environmental problems.50 In a situation of increased 
                                                 
47 Seminar with Klaus Müller, Green Party financial spokesman, Oslo, August 20, 1999. 
48 Hanf et al. (1996). 
49 Interview with two civil servants at BMWi, Bonn, September 23, 1997. 
50 Interview with representative from the ENGO “Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung,” Bonn,  
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involvement from several sub-actors, the Domestic Politics model suggests that a 
process of redefinition of the policy problem occurs, so that climate policy becomes just 
as much a matter of energy policy, transportation policy, etc. The redefinition of the 
issue and the take-over by sector agencies tend to reinforce each other.51 This brings in 
the assumption made in the beginning of this section; that the most important difference 
from the Unitary Rational Actor model is that the calculus of behavior by domestic sub-
actors can lead to a lack of ability by the government to implement a preferred climate 
policy.  
 
Government control over state policy 
An obvious discrepancy has occurred in German climate policy over the period after 
COP1 in Berlin. The ambitious emissions reduction target (minus 25% of CO2 within 
2005) has proven to be hard to implement, despite the massive reductions achieved in 
the first years after the reunification. Economic recession and increased unemployment 
coupled with intensified activity and lobbying from both pro-active and counter-active 
interest groups towards climate policymaking processes are possible explanatory 
elements.  
 
The government control over state policy can, according to the Domestic Politics 
model, be seen as a function of several elements.52 First, the internal unity of the 
government may be important in explaining the difficulties with implementing a strong 
enough climate policy. The coalition between CDU and FDP between 1982 and 1998 
seems to have been a relatively harmonious collaboration. The new red-green coalition 
government, however, has had its differences during the first year of governance. 
Regarding climate policy, there have been internal disagreements about which policy 
measures are most adequate: energy savings or clean energy investments. This is a 
disagreement that goes between the Green Party allied with the left wing of SPD against 
the right wing of SPD. There is also friction between the Greens and the Schröder-wing 
(right wing) of SPD, which is criticized for being too closely connected with the coal 
and automobile lobbies.53 Second, the policy distance to major opposition parties can 
account for government lack of control over state policy. But in Germany, one of the 
most remarkable features of the climate policy has been the high level of agreement 
across traditional political dividends. There has always been a high degree of bipartisan 
support for climate policy decisions. The opposition parties through most of the 1990s 
(SPD and the Green Party) did to a large degree support the Kohl government 
decisions. They criticized that the implementation was too weak, but supported the 
general policy direction. This bipartisan support continues today: Apart from criticism 
against the ecological tax reform, the opposition parties (now the CDU and FDP) 
support the government’s climate policy direction. Third, the Domestic Politics model 
points to the personal authority of the head of government as a likely explanatory 
element. Chancellor Kohl seems to have had a personal interest in the climate change 
issue, and he took initiatives that pushed the policy process forward. For instance, his 
speech at the COP1 in Berlin is regarded as decisive as an incentive to the elaboration 
on domestic strategies. And he said several times that it was Germany’s goal to reach a 
                                                                                                                                                        
November 3, 1999. 
51 Underdal (1998): p. 17. 
52 Based on Hanf et. al (1996). 
53 Interview with a scientific advisor for the parliamentary group of the Green Party, Bonn, June 2, 
1999. 
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real commitment for the industrialized countries in the negotiations about a Kyoto 
Protocol.54 
 
Another assumption made by the model is that a high degree of centralization of formal 
authority at the federal level is expected to facilitate the implementation of a climate 
policy. In Germany, the Länder have a certain degree of independence, but the 
majority of German climate policy measures are by federal ordinances that apply in all 
Länder. However, some effects can be seen of vertical fragmentation, for instance in 
Nordrhein Westfalen, where the Land-government continues to subsidize the coal 
industry while the federal government is reducing its coal subsidies. 
 
Issue linkages 
As pointed out in the section about the Unitary Rational Actor model, the nature of 
climate policy is such that it can not be dealt with in isolation from other policy issues. 
The examples from German climate policy have shown that the government has many 
other concerns, as has the general public. Climate policy has to “compete” with other 
issues for a place on the policy agenda. The most likely way for a policy proposal to find 
support is therefore through serving several policy needs at the same time. Issue 
linkages can develop both as a result of strategic or tactical considerations, or as a result 
of the situational context into which the issue is framed. These elements can determine 
what perspectives and premises are considered relevant, and which actors will have 
access to the policymaking process.55 With the new German coalition government, new 
constellations between political actors and new synergy effects between climate change 
and other political issues have arisen. The junior coalition partner, the Green Party, has 
had as one of its main policy issues for two decades the fight against nuclear power. 
Environmental minister Trittin has openly said that he will spend 60% of his time on 
working towards a phase-out of nuclear energy.56 But of course, a total phase-out of 
nuclear power in Germany would most probably mean that more power plants would 
be fired with fossil fuels, i.e. coal, oil or gas, in the future, which will have a negative 
effect on the climate. In this way synergy effects can give a new drive to policies, also 
towards other objectives than perhaps intended. Exogenous factors, like an election, 
can shed new light on political issues and thus lead to either progress or a standstill in 
the development of a particular policy.  
 
3.3 Third cut: Learning processes and social norms 
The third approach used here to explain climate policymaking is less clearly developed 
than the two first models. It is based on a new direction of study in international 
relations that over the last decade has challenged the agent-based, interest-driven 
explanation of policy behavior that the two preceding models represent. Constructivism 
is concerned not only with analyzing policy formulation patterns as a material calculus 
to maximize self-interest, but also attempt to take into account action resulting from the 
social environment. An assumption is also made about the social environment as being 
capable of shaping and changing the actor interests/preferences. To be more specific, 
the two most important differences to the Unitary Rational Actor model and the 
Domestic Politics model can be summarized in two assumptions made by 
                                                 
54 Interview with a civil servant at the Chancellors Office, Bonn, June 2, 1999 
55 Underdal (1998): p. 19. 
56 Interview with a representative for the ENGO Germanwatch, Bonn, June 3, 1999. 
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constructivists.57 First, they assume that material structures are given meaning only by 
the social context through which they are interpreted. Second, they address the relation 
between human agents/states and their structural environment. This is conceived of as 
an interactive process of preference formulation, where state interests emerge from and 
are endogenous to interaction with structures.  
 
The clearest difference that appears between the three models from these assumptions 
is the way they all conceive of interest formulation. The first emphasizes the influence of 
structures as a constraint on the behavior and choices of states operating according to 
means-ends calculations; the second emphasizes the influence of domestic actors and 
the distribution of power and influence between them; and the third emphasizes the 
social context in which structures are formed. This third model is different from the 
other two in another important way too, in that it “allows for” the preferences of the 
actors to change during the policy formulation process. Looking into the content and 
sources of state interests, social norms are seen as constituting states/agents and 
providing them with understandings of their interests. This means that a country can go 
into, for instance, international negotiations on a subject with one set of preferences, 
and gain new knowledge about the issue during the negotiation process that leads to a 
change of preferences and thus also a change of state behavior. 
 
The learning process in Germany 
The assumption about tentative preferences indicates that decision-makers may enter 
policy-processes with imperfect information and a will to learn. Accordingly, they 
engage in an active search for information and ideas, as well as in persuasion of other 
actors.58 In Germany, perhaps even more active than in other European countries, a 
learning process was initiated at the end of the 1980s. The public opinion and the 
international attention to the climate change problem brought on the establishment of a 
parliamentary Enquete Commission in 1987. The Commission was composed of 
politicians and scientific experts, and knowledge was transferred between them in the 
sense of interpreting the science and formulating political needs. All political parties 
participated actively in the national debate on the issue at the time, together with 
scientists, industry interests, trade unions, and other environmental interests in 
Germany. The work of this commission is considered to be extremely successful and to 
have shortened the phase of issue framing considerably.59 Another important element 
that made the Enquete Commission a success was the fact that its leadership was 
conducted in a very objective way. The leader team, from CDU and SPD, were able to 
lay aside traditional differences and work together in the Commission in a most 
constructive way.60 This made the Commission’s work important as a learning 
“platform” for societal interests, and has become a common knowledge base and a 
reference point for all participants in the subsequent national policymaking phases. 
 
German climate policy has also been influenced by the work of the IPCC (the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change). The IPCC was set up by the UN in 1988 to 
undertake internationally coordinated scientific assessments of climate change. In 
Germany it has functioned as an important basis for legitimacy of research results. 
During the work of the Enquete Commission, careful comparisons with IPCC’s results 
                                                 
57 See Checkel, J. (1998): “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, in World 
Politics, Vol. 50, January. 
58 Hanf et al. (1996): p. 14. 
59 Beuermann and Jäger (1996): p.194. 
60Interview with Bundestag representative for SPD, Bonn, May 31, 1999.  
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were made all the way.61 According to the assumptions made in the Social Learning 
model, the social context of the time with strong environmental awareness and concern 
about the consequences about climate change constituted the international norm of 
more and more countries engaging in developing a climate policy. In this policy 
process, at least Germany seems to have had preferences and interests that changed 
underway. An interpretation of the process according to this explanatory model could 
be that the high ambitions the country started out with in 1990, promising to reduce 
emission of CO2 with 25% from 1990-level within 2005, has changed somewhat with 
new knowledge. The international norm in the late 1980s, where industrialized 
countries were learning more and more about the interconnectedness between the 
environment and human actions that could disrupt the ecosystems, may have been one 
reason why Germany showed a will to take on a strong climate policy and even be 
willing to be a front-runner. However, these preferences seem to have changed, as the 
implementation of national climate policy measures have been difficult to achieve. It 
could be a result of the learning process since more knowledge can result in changed 
preferences as the Social Learning model would suggest.  
Knowledge diffusion 
It is a general assumption that actors with a high knowledge level are able to control the 
shaping of policy alternatives to a greater extent than are actors with an inferior 
knowledge level. Thus, it must be expected that the policy measures carried out in 
countries possessing the highest level of relevant knowledge will be copied by others.62 
The assumption implies that social learning will lead to diffusion of policy measures and 
ideas between countries. This has been the case in the international climate change 
negotiations, where the secretariat of the Framework Convention on climate Change in 
Bonn, Germany has functioned as an instrument for knowledge diffusion. For instance, 
all signatories send their national reports to the secretariat, where they are available for 
others to make use of.  
 
In general, it seems clear that Germany has been an exporter of ideas and knowledge in 
the international climate change negotiations. The successful agreement made between 
the large industrial organizations and the government in 1995/96 is an example of a 
policy instrument that other countries have tried to copy. Also, the catalogue of more 
than 130 policy measures is impressive, and a policy approach the Germans would want 
other countries to copy.63 The process of knowledge diffusion can also be expected 
between interest groups and the policy-makers at the domestic level. Organized 
interests in Germany put a lot of effort into keeping their organization updated in the 
issue area.  
 
If we move along with the assumption that policies develop to a large extent through 
learning, i.e. through the adoption of new knowledge and ideas, and that social norms 
lie beneath these processes, we can develop the argument one step further. Policies are 
maintained through becoming incorporated into the actor’s identity. Put differently, 
norms are collective understandings that make behavioral claims on actors and 
constitute actor identities and interests as opposed to simply regulating behavior.64 An 
illustration is the new institutional channels for exchange of information and learning 
that have been incorporated into the German governmental system in the 1990s. The 
most important one has been the inter-ministerial working group working with CO2 
reductions. Consisting of the five most relevant ministries, it has been given the role of 
developing policy alternatives and measures that Germany can apply to implement its 
                                                 
61 Beuermann and Jäger (1996): p. 195. 
62 See Hanf et al. (1996): p. 13 
63 Said by environmental minister Trittin in Umwelt No. 10, 1999. 
64 Checkel (1998): p. 327. 
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CO2 reduction target. The exchange of information and knowledge between the 
ministries within the group is important, and it has become easier over time to achieve 
agreement among the representatives for the different ministries to agree on policy 
design.65  
 
According to the Social Learning model, one can expect a change in actor identity over 
time, where the members of the group will have preferences and interests shaped by the 
norms in the group and what they learn there. This, too, was reflected in the case of 
Germany. Another new governmental channel in the 1990s was the contact group on 
climate policy organized by the former environmental minister. Consisting of organized 
interests both pro-active and negative towards climate change, like industry, ENGOs, 
trade unions and churches, it had a function of information exchange and learning. It 
was one of the factors that have transformed the environmental non-governmental 
organizations in Germany from being a protest/confrontational movement, towards a 
more cooperative line. 
 
                                                 
65 Interview with two civil servants at BMWi, Bonn, September 23, 1997. 
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4 Conclusions 
 
In the presentation of the three explanatory models, I wanted to investigate how much 
of the actor behavior each of the models could account for, and which provides the 
most fruitful approach given my particular purpose of analysis. The analysis above 
shows that the models represent different aspects of explaining policymaking behavior, 
and each are best applicable within those areas. Therefore, using all three models 
probably provides the richest form of explanation.  
 
From the three models it is possible to develop a rich set of non-trivial, probable 
assumptions. The assumptions give input to understanding climate policymaking 
behavior. The Unitary Rational Actor model gives us a set of assumptions about the 
state’s interest in calculating costs and benefits as a basis of decisions. By avoiding 
including sub-actors into the analysis, it becomes possible to analyze behavior while 
assuming that the actor is unitary and in full control of the situation. This model 
performs best when the intention is to describe the general interests of Germany. This 
was demonstrated by the discussion about international structures, and how they guide 
behavior in certain directions and pose limits to the number of options for action. For 
Germany, the economic difficulties and increasing unemployment of the last few years 
have been structures that have been important and restrictive for climate policy choices, 
not least because of the chances for decreasing competitiveness compared to major 
trade-partners in the world markets. This can be one explanation of why there is a 
discrepancy between ambitions to be a leader and the lack of political will for domestic 
implementation of CO2 reductions.  
 
The Domestic Politics model, on the other hand, presents a set of assumptions where 
domestic actors have different sets of preferences, and where the internal distribution of 
costs and benefits between them is crucial for decisions on climate policy conduct. The 
focus is on the role of sub-national actors, their interests, and their relationships to the 
institutions that comprise domestic politics. It was demonstrated that what goes on 
inside the state is critical in understanding climate change policymaking. In Germany, 
the role of large industrial associations in influencing the implementation of a voluntary 
agreement for reduction of industrial GHG emissions rather than green taxation in 1996 
is a case in point.  
 
The Social Learning model takes a different angle, as it assumes that the learning 
process that climate policy actors are involved in is able to change their interests and 
preferences as the policy process unfolds. It is concerned not only with analyzing policy 
formulation patterns as a material calculus to maximize self-interest, but also with trying 
to take into account action as a result of social norms and the social environment. Both 
the assumptions about the learning process and about knowledge diffusion seem to find 
empirical support in the case of Germany. This is shown in the discussion about the role 
of the inter-ministerial working group addressing policy design for achieving CO2 
reductions. The exchange of knowledge and preferences between the ministries within 
the group is important, and it has become easier over time to achieve agreement among 
the representatives for the different ministries to agree on policy design. 
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The three models have different areas of application, and therefore different areas in 
which they will provide the most fruitful explanatory approach. In other words, the best 
choice of explanatory model will depend on the purpose of the analysis: the more 
specific or closer you want to get to analyzing the behavior of an actor and its social 
surroundings, the more difficult it would be to use the Unitary Rational Actor model. 
Also, the more cooperation and interconnectedness between actors there is, the more 
fruitful it would be to use the Social Learning model. In the case of policymaking within 
the issue of climate change, it seems not only useful but perhaps also necessary to use all 
three models. Because the issue area of climate change is so complex, using all three 
models simultaneously can generate a rich set of assumptions that help us to understand 
and describe the behavior in policymaking, a set that would not be possible with only 
one model. 
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